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In Portugal, measles vaccination coverage and popu-
lation immunity are high, and no endemic measles 
cases had been reported since 2004. The World Health 
Organization classified measles as eliminated in the 
country in 2015 and 2016, based on data from the pre-
vious 3 years. However, in a context of increasing inci-
dence in several European countries in 2016 and 2017, 
Portugal experienced two simultaneous measles out-
breaks with a total of 27 laboratory-confirmed cases 
(0.3 cases/100,000 population) in two health regions 
between February and May 2017. Nineteen cases 
(70.1%) were adults, of whom 12 were healthcare work-
ers. Overall, 17 cases (63.0%) were not vaccinated, of 
whom five were infants younger than 12 months of 
age. One unvaccinated teenager died. Genotype B3 
was identified in 14 cases from both regions. Measles 
virus sequencing identified different possible origins 
of the virus in each region affected. Although measles 
transmission was stopped in less than 2 months from 
the first case being notified, these outbreaks repre-
sent an opportunity to reinforce awareness of measles 
diagnosis. We highlight the intensity of the control 
measures taken and their impact on the rapid control 
of the outbreaks and also the fact that high vaccina-
tion coverage was crucial to stop transmission.
Introduction
Measles is one of the most highly contagious infectious 
human diseases and can cause serious illness, lifelong 
complications and death. The widespread use of safe 
and cost-effective measles vaccines in national immu-
nisation programmes globally has resulted in a steep 
decrease in measles cases and deaths worldwide [1]. 
Following the 2010 decision by the Member States in 
the World Health Organization (WHO) European Region 
to initiate the process of verifying elimination, the 
European Regional Verification Commission for Measles 
and Rubella Elimination was established in 2011 [1]. In 
this context, the Global Measles and Rubella Strategic 
Plan 2012–2020 and the European Vaccine Action Plan 
2015–2020 both include measles elimination as a main 
objective [2,3].
Currently, in accordance with the Portuguese National 
Immunisation Programme (NIP), two doses of MMR vac-
cine are recommended for children (at 12 months and 5 
years of age) [4]. Due to consistent and sustained high 
immunisation coverage against measles (> 95%), the 
number of measles cases has declined dramatically 
over the past two decades (Figure 1). The last major 
measles outbreaks took place in 1987–89 and 1993–
94, and the last reported suspected endemic measles 
cases in Portugal were reported in 2003. Thus, WHO 
Europe classified measles as eliminated in the country 
in 2015 and 2016, based on data from the previous 3 
years [5].
In a context of increasing number of outbreaks in 
European countries [6], with 30 European Union (EU)/
European Economic Area (EEA) countries reporting 
5,881 cases between 1 March 2016 and 28 February 
2017 [7], two measles outbreaks were detected in 
Portugal at the beginning of 2017 [8]. The first outbreak 
was identified in the Algarve health region (southern 
Portugal) and another outbreak was identified in the 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley health region. The latter lasted 
until May 2017 and, overall, 27 confirmed cases were 
notified to health authorities.
The aim of this article is to describe, beyond the previ-
ous rapid communication [8] and in further detail, the 
two measles outbreaks that occurred in the Algarve 
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and Lisbon and Tagus Valley health regions between 
February and May 2017, the control measures taken, 
their impacts in the community, the workforce involved, 
the challenges faced in contact tracing and the lessons 
learnt.
Methods
Measles epidemiological surveillance
Physicians who suspect a measles case are expected 
to report to local public health authorities and to col-
lect samples to send to the WHO-certified national ref-
erence laboratory for measles and rubella, the National 
Institute of Health (Instituto Nacional de Saúde Doutor 
Ricardo Jorge, INSA) [9,10]. Notification to public health 
authorities is currently done electronically through 
the National System for Epidemiological Surveillance 
(Sistema Nacional de Vigilância Epidemiológica, 
SINAVE), which records clinical and laboratory notifi-
cations. Likewise, INSA also reports laboratory results 
electronically through SINAVE. Following each clini-
cal notification, an automatic email alert is generated 
for local, regional and national public health authori-
ties. Local public health authorities are responsible 
for undertaking epidemiological investigation and 
implementation of immediate control measures for 
each suspected case identified. All cases described 
in these outbreaks were notified through SINAVE. The 
first cases identified in both transmission chains were 
first notified by the laboratory, while the others were 
primarily notified by clinicians. For all confirmed cases, 
there was a clinical and a laboratory notification.
Case definition and classification
The measles case definition and classification used 
during these outbreaks meet the criteria of the 
European Union case definition [11] and have already 
been described in the previous rapid communication 
[8].
Epidemiological investigation
Local public health units were responsible for under-
taking epidemiological investigation and implementa-
tion of control measures for each suspected measles 
case identified. Regional public health departments 
coordinated those investigations and communicated 
with the national level: INSA and DGS. For each sus-
pected measles case, extensive contact tracing was 
carried out, which allowed, for confirmed cases, the 
identification of earlier cases who had not yet been 
diagnosed or notified. Epidemiological investigations 
also made it possible to identify and document clear 
links between confirmed cases in both transmission 
chains.
Figure 1
Evolution of measles vaccination strategy and number of measles cases in Portugal, 1973–2016 (n = 20,589)
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Laboratory investigation
Laboratory investigation was carried out by INSA. 
Laboratory tests included serum IgG and IgM meas-
urements, or measles nucleic acid detection or mea-
sles virus isolation in oral fluids, throat swabs or 
urine. Genetic characterisation was carried out in all 
measles-RNA-positive cases. Genotype was deter-
mined by sequence analysis of the 450 nt that code the 
C-terminal of the nucleoprotein (N) according to WHO 
protocol [12].
 
Outbreak description
From 1 January until 30 June 2017, 243 suspected mea-
sles cases were reported in Portugal, of which 222 
were laboratory investigated. During this period, 27 
cases were confirmed, 5 were possible, and 211 were 
discarded. Among confirmed cases, two imported mea-
sles cases were identified in the North and Alentejo 
health regions, which corresponded to isolated cases 
with no epidemiological or genotypic links to the cases 
in the two outbreaks described in this paper.
Overall, the two outbreaks included 27 confirmed cases 
in two health regions: Algarve (7 cases, 1.58/100,000 
population) and Lisbon and Tagus Valley (20 cases, 
0.55/100,000 population) (Figure 2). Of the 27 con-
firmed cases, 17 were unvaccinated, 12 were health-
care workers, and one unvaccinated teenager died 
(Figure 3).
Algarve outbreak
The outbreak in the Algarve health region was notified 
to health authorities on 30 March.
Overall, this transmission chain comprised seven con-
firmed cases (Figure 3; Table). Cases 1, 2, 3 and 4 were 
infants younger than 1 year and therefore were not yet 
vaccinated with the measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) 
vaccine. Case 5 was an unvaccinated adult. Only Cases 
6 and 7 had been vaccinated with two doses of the 
MMR vaccine, with the second dose given more than 10 
years. Six of these cases acquired measles in a health-
care setting, including two healthcare workers.
As Case 1 had not travelled abroad, the most likely 
hypothesis, in a context of measles elimination with 
high population immunity and in a popular European 
touristic destination, is that an unknown case (Case A) 
who acquired measles abroad, came into contact with 
Case 1 around week 6 2017. However, Case A was nei-
ther diagnosed nor reported to health authorities.
Lisbon and Tagus Valley outbreak
The outbreak in the Lisbon and Tagus Valley health 
region was notified to health authorities on 6 April.
This transmission chain comprised 20 confirmed 
cases (Figure 3;  Table), including two infants, two 
adolescents and 16 adults. Of the 20 cases, 10 were 
healthcare workers, 12 were unvaccinated, 8 were hos-
pitalised, and one died.
Cases 1 and 2 did not report recent travel abroad and 
did not have contact with each other. The fact that both 
had disease onset within 5 days suggests that they 
may have acquired measles from a common source. As 
in the Algarve health region, the most likely hypothesis 
is that an unknown measles case who acquired mea-
sles abroad (Case B) came into contact with these two 
cases in different settings. Case B was neither diag-
nosed nor reported to health authorities.
Characteristics of cases
The median age of the 27 confirmed cases was 25 
years (range: 0–45 years). Most confirmed cases 
(n = 19) occurred in adults (≥ 18 years), two cases were 
adolescents, and six cases occurred in infants under 
15 months of age (Table). Twelve cases were healthcare 
workers.
Of the 27 cases, 17 had not been previously vaccinated, 
while the remaining cases had documented evidence 
of one (n = 2), or two or more doses (n = 8) of a measles-
containing vaccine, either single or combined (Table). 
Of the 10 cases who were previously vaccinated, nine 
were healthcare workers (Table).
Among the unvaccinated cases (n  =  17), five were 
infants under 12 months of age and thus too young 
to be vaccinated, one was a 13-month-old infant, two 
were adolescents, and the remaining nine cases were 
adults (Table).
Figure 2
Measles cases by vaccination status, Algarve and Lisbon 
and Tagus Valley health regions, Portugal, February–May 
2017 (n = 27)
< 1 1–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49
≥2 doses = 8
1 dose = 2
0 doses = 17
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Nu
m
be
r o
f m
ea
sl
es
 c
as
es
Age group (years)
Source: National System for Epidemiological Surveillance (Sistema 
Nacional de Vigilância Epidemiológica, SINAVE) / Directorate-
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Two of the 12 healthcare workers had received one 
dose and seven two or more doses of measles-con-
taining vaccine; three healthcare workers had not been 
previously vaccinated (Table).
Laboratory results
Up to 30 June, samples from 222 suspected measles 
cases were sent to INSA for laboratory investigation, 
of which 27 cases related to these outbreaks were lab-
oratory-confirmed measles cases. Eleven cases were 
confirmed by using PCR testing of oral fluids or urine 
specimens, while other 11 cases were confirmed by 
detection of measles-specific IgM antibodies in serum; 
in four cases, both IgM and PCR positive test results 
were reported, and one case was confirmed through 
elevation of IgM levels in a pair of titres.
For one of the 15 PCR-confirmed cases, the geno-
type could not be identified, because of low number 
of copies. In the remaining 14 cases, the sequence 
was identified as the B3 measles virus, which is the 
same genotype detected in other outbreaks in Europe 
in 2016 and 2017, including Belgium and Italy [13,14]. 
However, through the phylogenetic analysis of the 
measles virus, it was possible to identify two possible 
different origins.
In the Algarve health region, the identified sequences 
were phylogenetically similar to the virus type circulat-
ing in Germany in 2016 and 2017, which suggests that 
Case A (neither identified nor reported) could have 
travelled from Germany by the end of January 2017 
and come into contact with with Case 1 in the Algarve 
health region (Figure 3).
In the Lisbon and Tagus Valley health region, the 12 
identified sequences were all the same, even though 
not all epidemiological links in this cluster were clearly 
documented. Theses sequences were phylogenetically 
identical to the virus type circulating in France and Italy 
in 2016 and 2017, which suggests that Case B could 
have travelled from France or Italy in end of February 
2017 and come into contact with Cases 1 and 2 in the 
Lisbon and the Tagus Valley health region (Figure 3).
Figure 3
Measles transmission chains, Algarve and Lisbon and Tagus Valley health regions, by week of rash onset, Portugal, 
February–May 2017 (n = 27)
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Control measures
The increasing number of measles cases reported in 
several European countries in 2016 and early 2017 
led the Directorate-General of Health (Direção-Geral 
da Saúde, DGS) to issue an alert to healthcare ser-
vices, followed by recommendations and guidelines 
about diagnosis, early detection and response to mea-
sles cases, within the scope of the National Measles 
Elimination Programme [10]. After the identification 
of the first measles case, a contingency plan was 
implemented, which included four main axes: (i) con-
tainment, prevention and control; (ii) training; (iii) 
information sources and (iv) communication.
A specific algorithm for early detection of measles was 
also created within the National Health Service contact 
centre (SNS 24) for triage of suspected cases by phone.
In these outbreaks, all reported suspected measles 
cases were investigated and control measures were 
promptly implemented at the local level to contain 
transmission (Figure 4). According to national guide-
lines, when a suspected measles case is identified by 
a physician, the patient should be immediately iso-
lated (at the hospital or at home) until 4 days after rash 
onset. Simultaneously, samples must be collected and 
sent to INSA for laboratory investigation and the case 
must be notified to public health authorities (Figure 4).
Several teams undertook extensive and rapid contact 
tracing for all measles cases. While public health units 
mainly conducted contact tracing in the community, 
occupational health teams and nosocomial infections 
teams undertook contact tracing at workplaces and 
hospitals, respectively.
Contacts and relatives of cases were informed about 
measles transmission, risk and prevention, and their 
vaccination status was assessed. When unvaccinated 
Table
Characteristics of measles cases, Algarve and Lisbon and Tagus Valley health regions, Portugal, February–May 2017 (n = 27)
Region Case
Age 
group 
 
(years)
Sex Rash onset MMR doses Last dose Hospitalisation Complications Genotype
Algarve
1 < 1 M 23 Feb 0 NA Yes
Pneumonia
NK
2 < 1 F 5 Mar 0 NA Yes NK
3 < 1 M 11 Mar 0 NA Yes NK
4 < 1 M 21 Mar 0 NA Yes NK
5 19–25 M 21 Mar 0 NA Yes NK
6 26–35 F 6 Apr 2 1991 No B3
7 19–25 F 8 Apr 2 2003 No B3
Lisbon and 
Tagus Valley
1 36–45 F 17 Mar 0 NA Yes
Pneumonia
NK
2 36–45 F 22 Mar 0 NA Yes NK
3 36–45 F 27 Mar 0 NA Yes NK
4 < 1 M 30 Mar 0 NA Yes B3
5 36–45 F 1 Apr 0 NA No NK
6 36–45 F 3 Apr 0 NA No
Diarrhoea
NK
7 36–45 F 4 Apr 0 NA Yes NK
8 26–35 M 4 Apr 0 NA No B3
9 26–35 F 11 Apr 2 1995 No NK
10 36–45 F 12 Apr 1 1976 No B3
11 19–25 F 12 Apr 2 2007 No B3
12 36–45 F 13 Apr 1 1977 No B3
13 19–25 F 13 Apr 2 2002 No B3
14 36–45 F 13 Apr 0 NA Yes Diarrhoea B3
15 1–18 F 13 Apr 0 NA Yes
Pneumonia
B3
16 26–35 M 23 Apr 3 1996 No B3
17 < 1 M 24 Apr 0 NA No NK
18 1–18 F 25 Apr 0 NA Yes B3
19 19–25 F 5 May 2 2001 No B3
20 19–25 M 13 May 2 2003 No B3
F: female; M: male; MMR: measles-mumps-rubella; NA: not applicable; NK: unknown.
Source: National System for Epidemiological Surveillance (Sistema Nacional de Vigilância Epidemiológica, SINAVE) / Directorate-General of 
Health (Direção-Geral da Saúde, DGS).
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contacts were identified, these were vaccinated 
whether the case was confirmed or not. Thus, this 
strategy was useful to enhance vaccination in the com-
munity. Close contacts of confirmed cases were offered 
either post-exposure vaccination or immunoglobulin.
Besides interviewing patients, hospital staff and family 
members, public health authorities had to liaise with 
airline companies and foreign public health authori-
ties, as one confirmed case had travelled abroad dur-
ing the incubation period (Case 16 from the Lisbon and 
Tagus Valley chain of trainsmission).
Epidemiological investigations and control meas-
ures were complemented with broader public health 
actions. Those were carried out by DGS and included 
the dissemination of key documents to support preven-
tion and control measures, for example, posters about 
clinical features of measles, guidelines, epidemiologi-
cal bulletins and background materials for healthcare 
services [15-17].
Additionally, DGS sent several emails to reinforce 
information about measles risk and prevention, tar-
geting healthcare workers and schools, and raised 
public awareness about the importance of vaccination 
through numerous reports in national media. Following 
these outbreaks, and in the scope of the National 
Measles Elimination Programme, DGS also set up a 
measles vaccination catch-up campaign [18].
Discussion
These outbreaks were the largest to have occurred in 
Portugal since 1993–94. The fact that the country had 
not had any endemic measles cases for more than a 
decade represented a challenge for health services 
in terms of diagnosis and sampling of all suspected 
cases identified. Despite extensive contact tracing 
and investigation of the possible source of infection 
for each measles case, this was the first time, since 
2004, that outbreaks had occurred without identifica-
tion of the imported primary cases. However, these two 
outbreaks were also an opportunity to increase mea-
sles diagnosis awareness among healthcare workers, 
as evidenced by the identification and investigation 
of more than 200 suspected measles cases between 
March and June 2017. Additionally, 1,200 and 1,600 
contacts of suspected cases were investigated by local 
public health authorities in the Algarve and Lisbon and 
Tagus Valley health regions, respectively. Identifying 
close contacts represents a challenge and additional 
effort for health authorities, as health services need 
to be adjusted when faced with an outbreak, including 
human resource management (for the rapid identifica-
tion of contacts, vaccination post-exposure in the first 
72 hours, administration of immunoglobulin to suscep-
tible persons), financial resources (strengthening vac-
cine stock, ensuring immunoglobulin availability). To 
this end, health service resilience is essential for quick 
control of the outbreak.
Figure 4
Control measures during the measles outbreak, Algarve and Lisbon and Tagus Valley health regions, Portugal, February–
May 2017
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Immunity against measles is high among the 
Portuguese population, due either to the free circula-
tion of the virus until 1972 or to sustained vaccination 
since 1973. In contrast to other European countries, 
Portugal has achieved sustained high immunisation 
coverage against measles. Vaccination coverage of two 
MMR doses in the population below 18 years of age has 
been at least 95% for more than two decades [19]. The 
third National Serological Survey (2015–16) showed a 
proportion of immune individuals of 94.2% in the gen-
eral population [20], confirming the results of the sec-
ond survey (2001–02) [21]. Results by age group show 
that those > 55 years and < 10 years were the age groups 
with the highest immunity (measles-specific IgG anti-
bodies ≥ 200 mUI/mL) [20]. People aged between 20 
and 29 years had the lowest immunity against measles 
[20]. In fact, most cases of the outbreaks presented 
here occurred in young adults who were either unvac-
cinated or had been vaccinated more than 10 years 
previously. This seems to be a possible consequence 
of lower antibody levels due to the absence of natural 
boosters (no circulation of the virus in the community) 
when the virus was circulating. In fact, the majority of 
vaccinated cases were healthcare workers who came 
into contact with measles cases. None of the vacci-
nated cases in both outbreaks was hospitalised or had 
complications.
The fact that healthcare settings were the main route 
of transmission in both outbreaks represented a chal-
lenge because any person in hospital environment, 
regardless of their role, can be affected, since measles 
is highly contagious and persists in the environment 
for up to 2 hours, requiring immediate implementation 
of control measures [22,23]. The NIP recommends two 
doses of MMR for healthcare workers in Portugal, but 
four cases were either unvaccinated or incompletely 
vaccinated. Therefore, verification of healthcare work-
ers’ immunisation status and vaccination of unvac-
cinated or non-immune individuals is demonstrated 
to be a critical component of the National Measles 
Elimination Programme. Given the high risk of expo-
sure and transmission that healthcare workers face, it 
is not surprising that even some who had received two 
doses of MMR vaccine became infected with measles 
virus. However, it is important to note that vaccinated 
healthcare workers experienced mild measles infec-
tion, did not need hospitalisation and did not transmit 
the disease.
These outbreaks and all the communication actions 
taken made healthcare workers and the general public 
aware that measles is still a threat and a serious dis-
ease, which can cause hospitalisations and deaths. As 
a result, not only during but also after the outbreak, 
demand for vaccination increased (data not shown).
Measures were taken to reinforce vaccination in com-
munities where MMR coverage was lower than 95%. A 
national catch-up campaign was set-up covering the 
following groups: (i) children and adolescents younger 
than 18 years (recommended schedule of two doses), 
with focus on pockets of susceptible population; (ii) 
healthcare workers (complete two doses for those who 
have never had the disease); and (iii) adults (≥ 18 years 
old) born in or after 1970 (one dose for those who have 
never been vaccinated and never had the disease), 
with focus on those aged 18–30 years.
Although the primary cases in both outbreaks could 
not be identified, measles sequencing was crucial to 
document the introduction of two different B3 geno-
types in Portugal, in the context of increasing num-
bers of outbreaks in European countries since 2016 [7]. 
Given the epidemiological situation in other European 
countries and the increasing popularity of Portugal as 
a travel destination, Portuguese public health authori-
ties should remain alert and strengthen epidemiologi-
cal surveillance to avoid future outbreaks.
Lessons learnt
Continuous maintenance of high vaccination coverage 
rates is critical to stopping transmission chains and 
controlling measles outbreaks. To this end, it is impor-
tant not only to notify unvaccinated people but also 
to implement innovative strategies to raise awareness 
among the population.
It was found that persons adequately vaccinated and 
with a high level of exposure when providing health-
care to cases developed measles; however, they pre-
sented a mild clinical picture.
It was verified that the cases occurring in vaccinated 
persons did not generate secondary cases, which is 
important for the prevention of transmission chains in 
health services.
The resilience of health services to measles outbreaks 
is a challenge which needs to be given particular 
attention by policymakers because of the high cost of 
resources involved in control measures.
In terms of the international epidemiological context, 
EU/EEA countries should maintain a high alert level.
Portugal is strongly committed to meeting the criteria 
defined by the WHO to maintain the status of measles 
elimination.
Conclusion
High vaccination coverage, and early and effective 
implementation of control measures contributed to 
the rapid interruption of measles transmission in both 
regions affected. Although Portugal has been success-
ful in meeting WHO’s objective of eliminating measles 
in the European Region, this disease is a challenge 
that requires a coordinated effort from all European 
countries due to the high risk of measles importa-
tion. Sustained high vaccination coverage, effective 
epidemiological surveillance and early implementa-
tion of control measures are critical to quickly contain 
8 www.eurosurveillance.org
outbreaks such as the one described here, and to 
interrupt virus circulation. These outbreaks represent 
an opportunity to strengthen the existing National 
Measles Elimination Programme and to enhance vac-
cination both in the community and among healthcare 
workers.
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